Prediction Poisoning: Towards Defenses Against DNN Model Stealing
  Attacks by Orekondy, Tribhuvanesh et al.
Prediction Poisoning: Utility-Constrained Defenses
Against Model Stealing Attacks
Tribhuvanesh Orekondy1 Bernt Schiele1 Mario Fritz2
1 Max Planck Institute for Informatics 2 CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security
Saarland Informatics Campus, Germany
Abstract
With the advances of ML models in recent years, we are seeing an increasing num-
ber of real-world commercial applications and services e.g., autonomous vehicles,
medical equipment, web APIs emerge. Recent advances in model functionality
stealing attacks via black-box access (i.e., inputs in, predictions out) threaten the
business model of such ML applications, which require a lot of time, money, and
effort to develop. In this paper, we address the issue by studying defenses for model
stealing attacks, largely motivated by a lack of effective defenses in literature. We
work towards the first defense which introduces targeted perturbations to the model
predictions under a utility constraint. Our approach introduces perturbations tar-
geted towards manipulating the training procedure of the attacker. We evaluate
our approach on multiple datasets and attack scenarios across a range of utility
constrains. Our results show that it is indeed possible to trade-off utility (e.g., devi-
ation from original prediction, test accuracy) to significantly reduce effectiveness
of model stealing attacks.
1 Introduction
Machine learning (ML) models are increasingly being deployed in a variety of real-world applications
e.g., home assistants, autonomous vehicles, commercial cloud APIs. The ML models in such
applications are valuable intellectual property of their creators, as developing them for commercial
use is a product of intense labour and monetary effort. Hence, it is vital to preemptively identify and
control threats from an adversarial lens focused at such models. To this end, the community recently
has taken great effort to address such issues by studying various subproblems such as evasion attacks
[7, 15, 17, 26], membership inference [22, 24], model stealing [19, 27, 29], and data poisoning
[2, 13, 23]. In this work, we focus on model stealing attacks, which involves an attacker attempting
to reconstruct a black-box victim ML model.
While knowledge distillation (KD) [3, 8] has led to advances in many problems (e.g., object detection
[4], classification [31]), variants of it are remarkably effective to perform model stealing. Here, the
attacker (student model) queries inputs to the victim blackbox (teacher model) to obtain respective
posterior predictions (soft targets). The stolen model is then trained on the ‘transfer set’ of inputs
and their corresponding posterior predictions. Recently, it was shown [20] that such attacks are
surprisingly effective, even when the inputs are from an independent distribution (e.g., ImageNet)
and different from that of the blackbox (e.g., birds classifier).
In this paper, we are motivated to study defenses against model attacks as existing defenses have
been largely ineffective. Specifically, the papers that propose stealing [20, 27] find the attacks
resilient to various forms of information truncation schemes (e.g., rounding posteriors, returning
top-k predictions). In the most extreme case, we too show that attacks are highly effective, even when
the attacker is provided the minimum information for the input query: a single most-confident label.
Hence, literature suggests protection against model stealing is currently not feasible, making model
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stealing attacks a threat to commercial ML applications, most of which allow a form of black-box
query access.
How do we work towards effective defenses for model functionality stealing attacks? We study
defenses in a black-box setup, where the only means of interaction between the attacker and the
defender are via black-box access: attacker inputs a query, defender returns posterior predictions.
Defending in such a scenario is especially challenging since the utility of the prediction is intertwined
with information of model functionality. We work towards defenses in a utility-constrained framework,
wherein the defender trades away some utility of the prediction to adversely impact the attacker.
Towards this goal, we list our contributions as:
• We propose the first utility-constrained defense framework against model stealing attacks.
• We present an approach which introduces bounded perturbations to the predictions, by
introducing targeted noise to degrade first-order approximations while training stolen models.
• Our extensive experiments on multiple datasets show that it is, under certain circumstances
and in principle, possible to defend against such attacks and thereby significantly reduce the
performance achieved by the stolen model.
2 Related Work
In this section, we review related literature on model stealing attacks and defenses.
Model Stealing Attacks. Stealing various aspects of a black-box model have been proposed:
parameters [27], hyperparameters [29], architecture [19], data membership information [24]. In this
paper, we focus on functionality i.e., the attacker intends to maximize test performance of the stolen
model. Two closely-related flavours of model stealing attacks exist: distillation-based [8, 20, 27]
and data-augmentation-based [11, 21]. In case of the latter, stealing the model is an intermediate
step towards the final goal of crafting adversarial examples. In this paper, we primarily use the
distillation-based approaches whose final goal is model stealing; they have shown to be highly
effective [27], even for stealing state-of-the-art vision models [20] despite minimal assumptions.
Identifying Stolen Models via Watermarks. Watermarking machine learning models [1, 9, 28, 30]
involves the owner training the model with an additional function e.g., uniquely activating to a set
of secret watermarked inputs. However, the primary purpose of watermarking is to prove post-hoc
ownership verification, rather than defend against stealing attacks. In contrast, we seek a preemptive
defense which adversely affects the performance of the stolen model.
Detecting Model Stealing Attacks. One proposed way to prevent model stealing attacks is by
characterizing consecutive input queries and detecting malicious intent. In [11], the authors identify
query inputs of augmentation-based model stealing attacks [11, 21] as having low inter-query input
distances in euclidean space (since the augmented inputs lie in a small Lp-bounded -ball). However,
this has a drawback that the attacker can query using multiple accounts, or simply increase the size
of the -ball to avoid detection. In contrast, we seek to poison the output predictions; a task that is
parallel (also which can be combined) with detection strategies.
Train-time Poisoning Attacks. In data poisoning attacks [2, 13, 14, 18, 23], an attacker intends to
corrupt a minimal set on input training examples that the victim eventually uses to train a model.
Predominantly, the corruption is done by perturbing inputs and optionally flipping the label. This is
reminiscent of our problem, but now with the defender intending to poison the training data of the
attacker. However, unlike data poisoning attacks, we do not have the ability to perturb inputs nor
assume prior access to the pool of examples that the attacker intends to query.
Altering Predictions. Existing literature that study defenses [16, 20, 27] show only limited success.
The strategies proposed in these simple defenses reduce or perturb the posteriors, while maintaining
the rank of the top-1 ‘argmax’ label i.e., accuracy of the task. However, consistent with their
observations, we too find this strategy has limited effect on a model stealing attacker. Hence, in this
paper, we work towards a utility-constrained defense allowing the defender to trade-off utility (e.g.,
perturbation magnitude, accuracy) for privacy i.e., poor performance of the adversary.
2
3 Problem Statement
In this section, we first recap model stealing and proceed towards formalizing the defense objective.
Model Functionality Stealing. Model stealing attacks [20, 27] are cast as an interaction between
two parties: a victim/defender V (teacher model) and an attacker A (student model). The only means
of communication between the parties are via black-box queries: attacker queries inputs x ∈ X
(typically images) and defender returns a posterior probability distribution y ∈ ∆K = P (y|x) =
FV (x), where ∆K = {y  0,1Ty = 1} is the probability simplex over K classes (we use K
instead of K − 1 for notational convenience). Using black-box access to the defender’s model, the
attacker trains a stolen model FA using the input-predictions pairs, i.e., the ‘transfer set’ of queries
Dtransfer = {(xi,yi)}Bi=1, with the end-goal of maximizing accuracy of FA on the defender’s test setDtest, which we denote as Acc(FA,Dtest).
Data-limited Attacker. In model stealing, in contrast to knowledge distillation (KD), students
(attackers) are justifiably data-limited i.e., do not have access to the entirety of labeled data as that of
the teacher (defender). What then makes for the inputs {x ∼ PA(X)} of the attacker? There are two
flavours: (a) independent distribution: [20, 27] samples inputs from some distribution (e.g., ImageNet
for images, uniform noise) independent to input data used to train the victim model; and (b) synthetic
set: [21] augment a limited set of input data by adding small input perturbations, that makes the
stolen model ideal as a surrogate for crafting adversarial examples. However, since the synthetic
set involves perturbations of images within a small -ball, they are potentially easier to detect and
therefore defend [11]. We choose (a), which is specifically targeted towards model stealing, also
which results in strongest attack performance and scales to complex state-of-the-art models.
Defender’s Objective. We now focus on the defender (the victim blackbox), who, given an
input x, intends to return posterior predictions y = FV (x). As part of the defense, the defender
now returns perturbed predictions y˜ = F δV (x) = y + δ s.t. y˜,y ∈ ∆K . The defender has
two objectives: (i) Privacy objective: to reduce the final stolen model accuracy of the attacker
Acc(FA,Dtest) (ii) Utility objectives: we explore two choices which measure the distance between
posteriors dist(y, y˜) ∈ R+ as: (a) dist-lp(y, y˜) = ||y − y˜||p = , also which serves as a proxy to
victim’s accuracy; and optionally (b) dist-argmax(y, y˜) = 0 if arg maxk yk = arg maxk y˜k and,∞ otherwise. In our experiments, we evaluate privacy as Acc(FA,Dtest). For utility, we consider
both accuracy Acc(F δV ,Dtest) and perturbation magnitude . Later in the paper (Section 5.2), we also
evaluate attacker’s strategies at circumventing the defender’s objectives.
Model Stealing Defense as an Optimization Problem As a defender, we would ideally like to
solve a bilevel optimization problem to poison [2, 13, 14, 18] the training data of the attacker:
max
{y˜i}
− Acc(FA(·; wA)) (Privacy objective) (1)
s.t. dist(yi, y˜i) ≤  (Utility objective) (2)
where wA = arg min
w
L(FA(·;w),Dtransfer) (3)
Dtransfer = {(xi, y˜i)}Bi=1
The idea here is to poison the attacker’s training data of the stolen model FA by introducing targeted
perturbations to predictions. However, this formulation faces few challenges: (a) the defender does
not have prior access to the pool of inputs {xi} the attacker wishes to query; and (b) the accuracy
objective (Eq. 1) is a complex function (Eq. 3) of the predictions returned by the defender.
To tackle these challenges, in this paper, given some input query x and prediction y = FV (x), we
wish to solve a simpler problem:
max
y˜∈∆K
− ProxyAcc(FA(·; wA), y˜) (Privacy objective) (4)
s.t. dist(y, y˜) ≤  (Utility objective) (5)
where we seek to poison a proxy to attacker’s training procedure of the stolen model by introducing
targeted perturbations y˜. In the next section, we elaborate on our choice of ProxyAcc(·) and discuss
an approach to optimize this problem.
3
4 Approach: Maximizing Angular Deviation between Gradients
In this section, we present our training poisoning objective (Eq. 4) and work towards an approach to
efficiently solve the utility-constrained model stealing defense problem (Eq. 4-5).
Motivation: Targeting First-order Approximations. We identify that the attacker eventually
optimizes parameters of a stolen (student) model F (·;w) (we drop the subscript ·A for readability) to
minimize the loss on training examples {(xi, y˜i)}. Common to a majority of optimization algorithms
is estimating the first-order approximation of the empirical loss, by computing the gradient of the
loss w.r.t. the model parameters w ∈ RD:
u = −∇wL(F (x;w),y) (6)
Maximizing Angular Deviation (MAD). The core idea of our approach is to perturb the posterior
probabilities y which results in an adversarial gradient signal that maximally deviates from the
original gradient (Eq. 6). More formally, we add targeted noise to the posteriors which results in a
gradient direction:
a = −∇wL(F (x;w), y˜) (7)
to maximize the angular deviation between the original and the poisoned gradient signals:
max
a
2(1− cos∠(a,u)) = max
aˆ
||aˆ− uˆ||22 (aˆ = a/||a||2, uˆ = u/||u||2) (8)
Given that the attacker model is trained to match the posterior predictions, such as by minimizing the
cross-entropy loss L(y, y˜) = −∑k y˜k log yk we can rewrite Equation (7) as:
a = −∇wL(F (x;w), y˜) = ∇w
∑
k
y˜k logF (x;w)k =
∑
k
y˜k∇w logF (x;w)k = GT y˜
whereG ∈ RK×D represents the Jacobian over log-likelihood predictions F (x;w) over K classes
w.r.t. parametersw ∈ RD. By similarly rewriting Equation (6), substituting them in Equation (8) and
including the constraints, we arrive at our poisoning objective:
max
y˜
∥∥∥∥ GT y˜||GT y˜||2 − G
Ty
||GTy||2
∥∥∥∥2
2
(= H(y˜)) (9)
where G = ∇w logF (x;w) (G ∈ RK×D) (10)
s.t y˜ ∈ ∆K (Simplex constraint) (11)
dist(y, y˜) ≤  (Utility constraint) (12)
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Figure 1: Objective. Illustrated
for y = [0.4 0.6] and choices of
y˜ ∈ ∆K=2.
Solving a Convex Relaxation. Directly optimizing this objective
presents a challenge of constrained maximization of a non-convex
objective (orange line in Fig. 1). Hence, we instead seek to solve a
convex relaxation, H˜(y˜) =
∥∥GT y˜ −GTy∥∥2
2
(blue line in Fig. 1).
Temporarily ignoring the utility constraint (Equation 12), the global
maximum y∗ for the relaxed objective is one of the extremes of the
(convex) simplex feasible set ∆K (see [10], Theorem 1), which we
denote as ext(∆K). In our scenario, y∗ can be tractably computed,
since ext(∆K) has only K elements. We denote the k-th extreme
as yk ∈ ∆K where yk = 1.
Enforcing dist-lp(·) objective: MAD. We estimate the perturbed posteriors y˜ as a linear com-
bination of the posteriors and the global maximum: y˜ = (1 − α)y + αy∗, where α is selected
such that the utility constraint (Equation 12) is satisfied. This can be done by solving for α using
bisection method, or solving for dist(y, y˜) = . An analytic solution exists for the latter in case of
Lp distances: α∗ := max
{

||y−y∗||p , 1
}
.
Including dist-argmax(·) objective: MAD-argmax. We now introduce a variant to additionally
encode the accuracy-preserving utility objective dist-argmax(y, y˜) of the defender. We do this by
4
preserving the most confident ‘argmax’ label: k = arg maxk yk = arg maxk y˜k in the perturbed
prediction. Within our approach, this amounts to restricting the search space in the simplex ∆K
(Equation 11). We absorb the k-th label-preserving constraint by iterating over the extremes of the
probability simplex ∆Kk = {y  0,1Ty = 1, yk ≥ yj , k 6= j} ⊆ ∆K .
5 Experimental Results
We now introduce our experimental setup in Section 5.1, followed by results in Section 5.2.
5.1 Experimental Setup Table 1: Victim Models.
FV Acc(FV ) PA
MNIST-LeNet 99.4% EMNISTLetters
FashionMNIST-LeNet 92% EMNIST
CIFAR10-VGG16 92% CIFAR100
Victim Models and Datasets. We set up three
victim models (see Table 1), each model trained
on a popular image classification dataset. We
train each model on their respective train sets
(60k examples for MNIST/FashionMNIST, 50k
for CIFAR10) and evaluate on their test sets (10k examples in each dataset). For MNIST and
FashionMNIST, we use a LeNet-like architecture with two convolutional layers (5 × 5 kernels; stride
1; 20, 50 channels), each followed by max pooling (2 × 2 kernel), and two fully connected layers; for
CIFAR10, we use VGG-16 [25]. We train all models from scratch for 50 epochs (100 for CIFAR10)
using SGD with a learning rate of 0.01 and 0.5 momentum.
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Acc(A), Undefended
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Figure 2: Attack effectiveness.
Attack Model. We use a distillation-based attack strategy [20] (an
extension to [27]), which in our preliminary experiments yielded
the strongest attack results. The attack is split into two steps: (a)
obtaining a transfer setDtransfer = {(xi,yi)}Bi=1 by querying images
xi ∼ PA(X) to the victim model; and (b) training a stolen model
FA to minimize the cross-entropy loss on Dtransfer. Our choices
of PA(X) for the data-limited adversary for each of the victim
models is listed in Table 1. EMNIST [5] is a dataset similar to
MNIST containing handwritten characters with upper-/lower-case
alphabets and digits. EMNISTLetters is a subset of EMNIST limited
to alphabets. By default, we use the victim architecture for stolen
models, but with different initializations. This minimally impacts
attack and defense performances (experiments for different choices of architectures in Section 5.2).
Due to the complex parameterization of VGG-16 (14M+), we initialize the weights from a pretrained
TinyImageNet model (except for the last FC layer, which is trained from scratch). We train all stolen
models in (b) for 50 epochs using SGD with a learning rate of 0.1 and 0.5 momentum.
Effectiveness of Attacks. In Figure 2, we present the test performance of the undefended victim V
model (dotted horizontal lines) and the attacker A’s stolen model (solid lines) for multiple budgets
(equal to number of queries to the victim model and size of transfer set). We observe for all three
victim models (represented in three colours), using just 50K black-box queries, the attacker is highly
effective, recovering up to 99.6% accuracy of the undefended model.
How Good are Existing Defenses? Most existing defenses in literature [16, 20, 27] perform some
form of information reduction on the posterior probabilities e.g., rounding, returning top-k labels; all
these defenses preserve the rank of the most confident label. We now evaluate our model stealing
attack on the extreme end of information truncation, wherein the defender returns just the top-1
‘argmax’ label. This strategy illustrates a rough lower bound on the strength of the attacker when
using existing defenses. In Figure 2, we observe that the attacker is minimally impacted, with a 3.3%
mean accuracy difference between undefended (solid lines) and argmax-defended (dash-dotted lines)
models. We find defenses in existing literature achieve limited success against model stealing attacks.
Defenses: Setup and Evaluation. We use a randomly initialized proxy model with the same
architecture as FV (defender’s model) to estimate the jacobian G (Eq. 10). Compared with other
initialization strategies (e.g., partially or completely trained), we found random initialization provide
a better gradient signal to poison the posteriors. Furthermore, we compute the jacobian G over
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Figure 3: Black-box attacker. Performance of strategies. ↑ denotes higher numbers are better and ↓, lower
numbers are better. Privacy objective is presented on the x-axis and utility objective on the y-axis. (a) Utility =
L1 distance (b) Utility = Defender’s accuracy. Region above the diagonal indicates instances where defender
outperforms the attacker. (c) Budget vs. Test accuracy of MAD at  = 0.95.
parameters of the final fully connected layer of the network. In preliminary experiments, this yielded
better results over using all parameters of the network.
We evaluate all defenses on a privacy-vs-utility curve at various operating points of the defense.
The privacy metric is fixed to accuracy of the stolen model on the held-out test data. We use two
utility metrics: (a) perturbation magnitude : measured as L1 distance ||y − y˜||1; and (b) accuracy:
test-accuracy of the defended model producing perturbed predictions.
We compare our approaches against two methods: reverse-sigmoid [16] and random-noise. Reverse-
sigmoid softens the posterior distribution and introduces ambiguity among non-argmax probabilities.
For this method, we evaluate privacy and utility metrics for the defense operating at various choices of
their hyperparameter β ∈ [0, 1], while keeping their dataset-specific hyperparameter γ fixed (MNIST:
0.2, FashionMNIST: 0.4, CIFAR10: 0.1). For controlled random-noise, we add uniform random noise
δz on the logit prediction scores (z˜ = z + δz , where z = log( y1−y )), enforce utility by projecting δz
to an z-ball [6], and renormalizing probabilities y˜ = 11+e−z˜ .
5.2 Results
We now discuss results of the proposed defenses.
How effective are the defenses? We evaluate approaches MAD and MAD-argmax on a privacy
(x-axis) vs. utility (y-axis) curves, as shown in Figure 3. Keeping the privacy objective (test accuracy
of attacker) fixed, we display individual curves for two utility metrics – perturbation  (Fig. 3a)
and test-accuracy of defender (Fig. 3b). Each point denotes the resulting performance of the model
stealing attack with varying utility budgets ( in case of our approaches). From Figure 3, we make
the following observations.
(i) Utility objective = L1 distance (Fig. 3a): Although random-noise and reverse-sigmoid reduce
attacker’s accuracy, it involves larger perturbations. In contrast, MAD and MAD-argmax provides
similar privacy with significantly lesser perturbation, especially at lower magnitudes of perturbation.
For instance, on MNIST (first column), MAD (L1 = 0.95) reduces the accuracy of the attacker to
under 80% with 0.63× the perturbation as that of reverse-sigmoid and random-noise (L1 ≈ 1.5).
(ii) Utility objective = argmax-preserving (Fig. 3b): By setting a hard constraint on retaining the label
of the predictions, we find MAD-argmax and reverse-sigmoid successfully reduce the performance
of the attacker by at least 20% across all datasets. Remarkably, we find MAD-argmax in addition
achieve this objective by introducing lesser distortion to the predictions compared to reverse-sigmoid.
For instance, in Fig. 3a, we find MAD-argmax consistently reduce the attacker accuracy to the same
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amount at lesser L1 distances. In reverse-sigmoid, we attribute the large L1 perturbations to a shift
in posteriors towards a uniform distribution e.g., mean entropy of perturbed predictions is 3.02 ±
0.16 (max-entropy = 3.32) at L1=1.0 for MNIST; in contrast, MAD-argmax displays a mean entropy
of 1.79 ± 0.11. However, common to label-preserving strategies is a pitfall that the most-confident
label is retained. How does the attacker perform if he/she were to train a stolen model discarding the
posteriors and only using the most-confident label for the query inputs? In Figure S2 (see overlapping
red and yellow cross-marks), we find that the attacker is able to completely recover the original
performance of the stolen model. In line with our previous experiment (Figure 2), results indicate the
label-preserving objective can be circumvented by the adversary by discarding the posteriors and
using the most-confident label during training. We now ask whether the defender can trade-off utility
(test accuracy or L1 perturbation) to significantly reduce the attacker’s performance.
(iii) A privacy-utility trade-off (Fig. 3b): Across all models, we find MAD provides reasonable
operating points (above the diagonal), where defender displays higher test accuracies compared to
the attacker. In Fig. 3c, for instance, at =0.95 on CIFAR10, we observe the defender’s test accuracy
(dotted lines) drop from 92% to 88% (a 4% absolute decrease). Whereas, the attacker’s accuracy
(solid lines) drops 6× from 78% to 54% (a 24% decrease). Moreover, as seen in Fig. S2, MAD
is robust even when the attacker solely uses the argmax labels while training. Our results indicate
promising operating points, where the defender can trade utility for a significant gain in privacy.
How much angular deviation doesMAD introduce? To estimate the angular deviation between
the true and the perturbed gradient, we conduct an experiment given the knowledge of the true
gradient direction at each training step. We simulate this by training a white-box attacker using
online SGD (LR=0.001) over N iterations using B distinct images to query and a batch size of 1.
At each step t of training, the attacker queries a randomly sampled input xt to the defender model
and backpropogates the loss resulting from y˜t. The perturbation y˜t here is crafted having exact
knowledge of the attacker’s parameters. We evaluate the angular deviation between gradients with
(a) and without (u) the perturbation.
In Figure 5, we visualize a histogram of deviations: θ = arccos u·a||u||||a|| , where u = ∇wL(wt,y, ·)
and a = ∇wL(wt, y˜, ·). We observe: (i) although our perturbation space is severely restricted (a
low-dimensional probability simplex), we can introduce surprisingly high deviations (0-115◦) in the
high-dimensional parameter space of the VGG16; (ii) for  values at reasonable operating points
which preserves the defender’s accuracy within 10% of the undefended accuracy (e.g.,  ∈ [0.95,
0.99] for CIFAR10), we see deviations with mean 24.9◦ (yellow bars in Fig. 5). This indicates that
the perturbed gradient on an average leads to a slower decrease in loss function; (iii) on the extreme
end, with  = max = 2, on an average, we find the perturbations successfully flips (>90◦) the gradient
direction leading to an increase on the test loss, a seen in Figure 6 (blue line). We find our approach
considerably influences the gradient direction.
Ablative Analysis. We present an ablation analysis of our approach in Figure 7. In this experiment,
we compare our approach MAD and MAD-argmax to: (a) MAD-relax: To maximize angular devi-
ation, inner maximization term (Eq. 9) is computed over the convex relaxation instead of the true
objective; (b)G = I: We substitute the jacobianG (Eq. 10) with a K ×K identity matrix; and (c)
y∗=rand: Inner maximization term (Eq. 9) returns a random extreme of the simplex. Note that (b)
and (c) does not use the gradient information to perturb the posteriors.
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Figure 7: MAD Ablation experiments. Utility = (left)
L1 distance (right) defender test accuracy.
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Figure 8: Subverting the Defense.
From Figure 7, we observe: (i) Poor performance of y∗=rand, indicating random untargeted per-
turbations of the posterior probability is a poor strategy; (ii)G = I , where the angular deviation is
maximized between the posterior probability vectors is a slightly better strategy; and (iii) MAD-relax,
which now uses gradient information, but solves the convex relaxation typically underperforms the
true objective, indicating that the relaxation is an imperfect surrogate; and (iv) MAD outperforms the
above approaches. Consequently, we find using the gradient information (although a proxy to the
attacker’s gradient signal) within our formulation (Equation 9) is crucial to providing better operating
points for model stealing defenses.
Subverting the Defense. We now explore various strategies an attacker can use to circumvent
the defense. To this end, we evaluate the following strategies: (a) argmax: attacker uses only the
most-confident label during training; (b) arch-*: attacker trains other choices of architectures; (c)
nquery: attacker queries each image multiple times; (d) nquery+aug: same as (c), but with random
cropping and horizontal flipping; and (e) opt-*: attacker uses an adaptive LR optimizer e.g., ADAM
[12]. We perform experiments with these strategies by keeping the budget fixed at B=50K.
We present results over the subversion strategies in Figure 8. Remarkably, we find our defense robust
to above strategies. Our results indicate that the best strategy for the attacker to circumvent our
defense is to discard the probabilities and rely only on the most confident label to train the stolen
model. For instance at L1=0.95, by discarding the probabilities, the attacker can increase accuracy of
the stolen model from 54% (0.62× defender’s test accuracy) to 69% (0.78×).
6 Discussion
Our approach shows promising results: there exist trade-offs where the defender can trade utility
(e.g., deviation from original prediction) to significantly reduce performance of the attacker’s stolen
model. However, we acknowledge that a trade-off is not an ideal solution; some commercial ML
applications might lose an edge over competition with a slight decrease in performance. We also
identify that although the proposed defense significantly reduces the attacker’s test accuracy, this
occurs at reasonably large deviations to posteriors ( > 0.5), which may not be ideal in some
scenarios.
In spite of certain limitations with the trade-offs, we make some key contributions. We propose the
first defense that shows encouraging results against model stealing attacks, either by significantly
slowing down the attack, or even potentially fully prevent it in the future, as we show that gradient
signals can be poisoned via targeted perturbed predictions.
7 Conclusion
In this work, we were motivated by limited success of existing defenses against models stealing
attacks. We address it by studying defenses as a utility-constrained optimization problem of a privacy
objective. We proposed as a proxy to the true privacy objective of minimizing attacker’s test accuracy,
an approach which poisons the victim’s training procedure by perturbing the predictions. Within
our framework of utility-constrained defenses for model stealing, we find our proposed approaches
exhibit promising operating points for defenses against model stealing attacks.
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Appendices
A Contents
The appendix contains:
A. Contents (this section)
B. Detailed Algorithm
C. Extension of Existing Plots
1. Budget vs. Accuracy
2. Argmax-attacker
3. Angular Deviations
4. Ablation Experiments
B Detailed Algorithm
We present a detailed algorithm (see Algorithm 1) for the approach described in Section 4 for in the
main paper.
1 Function PerturbedPredict-MAD(x):
Input: Input data x, model to defend FV (·; wV ), proxy attacker model F (·; w)
Output: Perturbed posterior probability y˜ ∈ ∆K s.t. dist(y˜,y) ≤ 
2 y := FV (x; wV ) // Obtain K-dim posteriors
3 G := ∇w logF (x; w) // Pre-compute (K x D) Jacobian
4 y∗ := arg maxyk∈ext(∆K)
∥∥∥ GTyk||GTyk||2 − GTy||GTy||2 ∥∥∥22 // Alternatively ext(∆Kk )
for MAD-argmax
5 Define h(α) = (1− α)y + αy∗
6 α∗ := arg maxα∈[0,1],dist(·)≤ dist(h(α), y
∗) // Find optimal step-size via
bisection, or OptStep(.) for Lp norms
7 y˜ := h(α∗) // Perturbed probabilities
8 return y˜
9
10 Function OptStep(y,y∗, , p):
11 α∗ := max
{

||y−y∗||p , 1
}
12 return α∗
Algorithm 1:MAD Defense. To supplement approach in Section 4.
C Additional Plots
In this section, we extend existing results in the main paper to cover all datasets.
C.1 Budget vs. Accuracy
We plot the budget (i.e., number of distinct black-box attack queries to the defender) vs. the test
accuracy of the defender/attacker in Figure S1. The figure supplements the discussion found in
Section 5.2 of the main paper under “How effective are the defenses?”.
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Figure S1: Budget vs. Test Accuracy. Supplements Fig. 3c in the main paper.
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Figure S2: Attacker argmax. Supplements Fig. 4 in the main paper.
C.2 Attacker argmax
In Figure S2, we perform the privacy-vs-utility evaluation (similar to Fig. 3b in the main paper) under
a special situation: the attacker discards the probabilities and only uses the top-1 ‘argmax’ label to
train the stolen model. Relevant discussion can be found in Section 5.2 of the main paper under “How
effective are the defenses?”.
C.3 Angular Deviations
In the white-box attacker setting, we plot the angular deviations obtained over all defender models
in Figure S3. The bottom row displays test-loss of the attacker evaluated during online training.
Discussions for this experiment in Section 5.2 of the main paper under “How much angular deviation
does MAD introduce?”.
C.4 MAD Ablation Experiments
We present the ablation experiments covering all defender models in Figure S4. Relevant discussion
is available in Section 5.2 of the main paper under “Ablative Analysis”.
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Figure S3: Histogram of Angular Deviations. Supplements Fig. 5,6 in the main paper. The test-loss during
of the attacker model for each of the histograms (over multiple  values) are provided in the bottom row.
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Figure S4: MAD ablation experiments. Supplements Fig. 7 in the main paper.
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